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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Order of the Utah Supreme Court this matter was 
poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals on May 25, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellant failed to comply with Rule 24(b)(5) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure by failing to provide the applicable 
standard of review and supporting authority for each issue she 
seeks to appeal. For the Court's benefit the following standards 
of review apply to each issue as framed by appellant: 
1. The standard of review pertaining to summary judgments 
has been clearly stated. Summary judgments present for review 
conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments 
do not resolve factual issues. Gridley Assoc., Ltd. v. Trans-
america Ins. Co. , 828 P.2d 524, 526 (Utah App. 1992); Transamerica 
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc. , 789 P.2d 24, 25 
(Utah 1990); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). This 
court should afford no deference to the trial court, but review its 
conclusions for correctness only. Goetz v. American Reliable Ins. 
Co. , 844 P.2d 366, 368 (Utah App. 1992); Allen v. Prudential 
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992). 
2. "The trial court has wide discretion to grant or deny a 
motion for a new trial . . . ." Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 
173 (Utah 1983) ; see also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 
789 (Utah 1991); Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982); 
Alpine Credit Union v. Moeller, 656 P.2d 988 (Utah 1982); Chournos 
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v. D'Aqnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982); Amoss v. Bennion, 517 P.2d 
1008 (Utah 1973); Uptown Appliance & Radio Co, v. Flint, 249 P.2d 
82 6 (Utah 1952). An order granting or denying a motion for a new 
trial will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion by 
the trial judge. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789 
(Utah 1991) ; Bar son by & Through Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984); Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730 
(Utah 1982); Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 
99 (Utah 1981). 
3. Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that no one is entitled to relief from an order or judgment due to 
an error in the judicial proceedings unless the error is harmful. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1991); 
Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Utah 1981). An error 
is harmful when there is a "reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
4. Under Rule 52, an appellate court will defer to the 
decision of the trial court unless the trial court's decision was 
"clearly erroneous." Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P. 2d 
896 (Utah 1989); Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989); 
Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987). A finding is 
clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of evidence or 
if the court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a 
mistake has been made. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); 
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Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988); Southland Corp, 
v. Potter. 760 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The determinative statute in resolving this appeal is Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (1991), "Limitations, Exclusions, and 
Conditions to Personal Injury Protection." The relevant statute is 
set forth in the addendum to appellants brief. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a civil suit for money damages arising out of an 
automobile accident between the plaintiff Tomasa Lidia Vigil 
("plaintiff") and the defendant Gary Nelson ("defendant"). The 
automobile accident occurred on October 8, 1987, at 5300 South 320 
West, Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff claims that the accident 
caused her injuries and related damages. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiff filed her complaint in the Third District Court on 
September 19, 1991. Discovery proceeded through November 13, 1992, 
at which time defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's 
complaint due to her failure to meet the statutory threshold 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-3 09. On December 2, 1992, 
Judge David S. Young ("Judge Young") issued a minute entry granting 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff had not 
met the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309. 
Judge Young entered an Order of Dismissal on December 11, 1992. 
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On December 17, 1992, plaintiff filed a Motion for Amendment 
of Order or New Trial and Request for Oral Argument, On February 
1, 1993, Judge Young issued a minute entry denying plaintiff's 
Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial and Request for Oral 
Argument, Judge Young entered an Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion 
for Amendment of Order or New Trial and Oral Argument on February 
16, 1993. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Defendant and plaintiff were involved in an automobile 
accident on October 8, 1987. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the 
Third District Court on September 19, 1991, seeking damages as a 
result of the automobile accident. Plaintiff's complaint alleges 
that she suffered "permanent partial disability" and that she has 
incurred medical expenses "in an amount to exceed $3,000.00." 
(Record on Appeal, pp. 2-5, hereinafter referred to as "RA"). 
2. Throughout discovery plaintiff failed to produce evidence 
that she incurred medical expenses in an amount exceeding 
$3,000.00. An examination of plaintiff's responses to Defendant's 
First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents, filed February 25, 1992, evidences this fact. 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants First Set of Interrogatories 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 8: 
Plaintiff has supplied, as attachment "A", the only 
itemization of expenses for her injuries incident to the 
occurrence presently available. Plaintiff is in the 
process of requesting and obtaining additional copies of 
expense charges to corroborate her earlier pleading 
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estimate and will make those available to defendant as 
soon as received. Plaintiff did not use any medical 
device or appliance related to her injuries following and 
stemming from the occurrence and believes that other drug 
expenses were for initial pain pills which she discon-
tinued in early 1988 and which amount should be in the 
range of approximately $100.00. (RA, p. 48) 
Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Request for Production of 
Documents 
Request No. 1: All invoices, statements, receipts, bills 
or other documentation from any hospitals, doctors, 
physical therapists or other persons or institutions 
practicing the healing arts and sciences relating to the 
treatment of any injury or condition allegedly sustained 
by plaintiff as a result of the incident complained in 
plaintiff's complaint. 
Response: Plaintiff has produced and attached as Exhibit 
"A" to the concurrently filed Answers to Interrogatories 
all present medical invoices or statements which she has. 
Plaintiff is presently obtaining and gathering additional 
statements and invoices and will make those available in 
response to this request as soon as received. Plaintiff 
also anticipates a further medical examination and treat-
ment for which she will supply copies of invoices and 
billing statements. (RA, p. 35) 
Attachment A to plaintiff's discovery responses is a copy of 
a medical bill from St. Mark's Hospital in the amount of $190.00. 
(RA, p. 39) No other medical bills or documents have been sub-
mitted to support plaintiff's alleged $3,000.00 medical expenses. 
3. Plaintiff was referred by her attorney to Dr. J. Mark 
McGlothlin for a medical examination on March 30, 1992. Dr. 
McGlothlin prepared an initial report dated March 30, 1992, setting 
forth his findings. Dr. McGlothlin also prepared an addendum 
report dated September 21, 1992. Neither report states that the 
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automobile accident caused plaintiff "permanent partial disability" 
as alleged in her complaint.1 (RA# pp. 55-67) 
4. Dr. McGlothlin's deposition was taken on November 9, 1992. 
Dr. McGlothlin testified that because of several holes in the data 
base he was unwilling and unable to specify what percentage, if 
any, of plaintiff's complaints were attributable to the automobile 
accident or were a result of pre-existing degenerative conditions. 
Specifically, Dr. McGlothlin testified: 
Q. Are you saying at least one-third of her 
expressed subjective as well as objective 
findings and range of motion, et cetera, are 
apportioned to pre-existing? Does that mean 
the other two-thirds are the accident, or what 
are you saying here? 
A. Two issues that are pertinent there. One 
is — probably the most critical issue is that 
when I saw her in March, and let's go back to 
starting on page nine of that report, in my 
opinion to really nail down what is going on 
with this lady there is a series of things 
that needed to be, and probably still need to 
be, done. And this is where I think — this 
is where I'm on thin ice and this is where I'm 
going to waffle with you a little bit because 
I don't know what all that left arm stuff is. 
I don't know if that's cardiac disease, if 
that's symptom exaggeration, or if it's subtle 
nerve irritation from tight muscles in her 
neck area, lack of thoracic outlet syndrome. 
So we have still got some data base 
holes, one being has this gal got a sick heart 
with an atypical chest pain syndrome, which 
would be the worse [sic] thing she could have, 
lA copy of the March 30, 1992, and supplemental September 21, 
1992, reports prepared by Dr. McGlothlin were attached as Exhibit 
B to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Dismiss. 
Plaintiff took no exception to the reports and adopted them as 
proper exhibits before the trial court. (RA, p. 71) 
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obviously. And I'm no cardiologist and would 
never testify as an expert, but I don't think 
that would be an accident relevant issue. I 
think that would be other things. 
On page 10 under subparagraph B, I 
mentioned that we have really got to be able 
to put together ideally a series of 
radiographs that help us objectify change. We 
have been talking about that. Obviously, we 
have some holes there. 
Subparagraph C, also on page 10, I 
projected at that time if we had a hard time 
rounding up appropriate data, we may need more 
specific and detailed radiographic data. . . . 
I think one of those, either of those studies 
would be helpful at this point. . . . I think 
an EMG would be useful. 
(Deposition of Dr. Mark McGlothlin, pp.52-54, 
RA, pp. 95-97) 
5. Subsequent to Dr. McGlothlin's deposition, plaintiff 
submitted an Affidavit of Dr. McGlothlin, dated November 10, 1992. 
Defendant opposed the Court's consideration of the affidavit 
because the affidavit contradicted Dr. McGlothlin's prior deposi-
tion testimony. (RA, pp. 77-81) 
6. On December 11, 1992, Judge Young entered an Order of 
Dismissal. Judge Young granted defendant's Motion to Dismiss on 
the grounds that the matter failed to reach the threshold level 
required in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309. (RA, pp. 106-07) 
7. On December 16, 1992, plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Amendment of Order or New Trial. (RA, pp. 112-13) In the motion 
plaintiff requested Judge Young to "amend by rescinding its prior 
Order of Dismissal." (RA, p. 112) 
8. In conjunction with plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of 
Order or New Trial, plaintiff submitted an affidavit in "opposition 
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to defendant's Motion to Dismiss because she was out of the juris-
diction and could not earlier respond." (RA, p.124) Defendant 
asked the Court to strike plaintiff's affidavit from the record on 
the grounds that the affidavit contained testimony that would not 
be admissible if testified to at trial. (RA, p. 157). 
9. On February 16, 1993, Judge Young entered an Order denying 
plaintiff's Motion for "Amendment of Order or New Trial" and 
Request for Oral Argument on the same. (RA, pp. 181-82) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court applied the proper standard of care in 
dismissing plaintiff's complaint due to her failure to meet the 
threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309. More than 
five years after the subject accident, plaintiff failed to provide 
any credible evidence that she suffered a "permanent partial 
disability." Additionally, plaintiff admitted that she had only 
incurred $190.00 in medical expenses during the five years after 
the accident. 
The trial court also did not err in refusing to reconsider its 
prior dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff failed to meet 
the requirements for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) and (7). 
Plaintiff failed to address how the evidence was insufficient to 
justify dismissal of this action or that the dismissal was an error 
in law. Additionally, plaintiff's motion for new trial was 
properly dismissed because it was nothing more than a motion to 
reconsider which is not allowed under the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure. There was no abuse of discretion which could lead this 
court to overturn the trial court7s ruling. 
Failure of the trial court to grant plaintiff's request for 
oral argument on her Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial is 
not grounds for reversal of the trial court's ruling. Under Rule 
4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the trial court 
can exercise discretion in denying a request for hearing when it 
finds that one of the two enumerated exceptions have been met: (1) 
the motion is frivolous or (2) the dispositive issue has been 
authoritatively decided. Rule 4-501 does not require the trial 
court to indicate in its memorandum decision the grounds for its 
denial of oral argument. As such the trial court did not commit 
reversible error in denying plaintiff's request for oral argument. 
The trial court was also not compelled to offer a written 
statement for the grounds for its decision under Rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The requirement to provide a 
written statement pursuant to Rule 52(a) arises only when the 
motion is based on "more than one ground." Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss plaintiff's complaint was based on only one ground, failure 
to meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309. 
As such, the trial court was not required to provide a written 




THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OP CARE 
IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS CLAIM WITH PREJUDICE 
Defendant does not dispute that once matters outside the 
pleadings are considered on a motion to dismiss that the matter 
turns into a motion for summary judgment. However, under either 
standard, plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed due to her 
failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-3 09. Plaintiff 
admitted that she had not incurred medical expenses sufficient to 
meet the $3,000.00 threshold requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-309. Additionally, plaintiff failed to provide any credible 
evidence that she suffered a "permanent partial disability" arising 
out of the subject automobile accident as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-309. No issue of material fact existed on either of 
these requirements making the trial court's ruling proper. 
The standard of review pertaining to summary judgments has 
been clearly stated. Summary judgments present for review 
conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments 
do not resolve factual issues. Gridley Assoc., Ltd. v. Trans-
america Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 524, 526 (Utah App. 1992); Transamerica 
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 
(Utah 1990); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). 
Thus, this court should afford no deference to the trial court, but 
review its conclusions for correctness only. Goetz v. American 
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Reliable Ins, Co. , 844 P.2d 366, 368 (Utah App. 1992); Allen v. 
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992). 
It was entirely within the province of the trial court to 
summarily dispose of the instant action. "[I]t is well settled 
that the court may not permit the jury to speculate upon the 
evidence and that a finding of fact cannot be based upon surmise, 
conjecture, guess, or speculation." Olsen v. Warwood, 255 P. 2d 
725, 727 (Utah 1953); Jackson v. Colston, 209 P.2d 566 (Utah 1949); 
Pern Inv. Co. v. Carbon County Land Co., 75 P.2d 660 (Utah 1938). 
Pursuant to Rule 3.3 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, counsel for defendant believes that she has a duty to 
advise this Court of legal authority not disclosed in appellant's 
brief. Subsequent to the lower court's ruling on defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss and prior to its ruling on plaintiff's Motion for 
Amendment of Order or New Trial, this Court addressed the monetary 
threshold requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-3 09 in Jepson v. 
State Department of Corrections, 846 P.2d 485 (Utah App. 1993). In 
Jepson this Court found that the plaintiff could have filed suit 
prior to incurring $3,000.00 in medical expenses "so long as his 
expenses exceeded the statutory minimum at time of trial." Jd. at 
488. Jepson, however, is distinguishable and does not govern the 
resolution in this case. 
Jepson is factually distinguishable from this case in many key 
respects. In Jepson, plaintiff contended on appeal that the trial 
court erred in granting the State's motion for summary judgment on 
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the basis of its conclusion that plaintiffs claim arose at the 
time of the accident, and thus Jepson did not timely file his 
notice of claim within one year after the claim arose pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1989). 
In Jepson, the automobile collision causing the plaintiff's 
injuries occurred on November 14, 1986. On December 8, 1987, the 
plaintiff met the statutory threshold of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
309 when his medical bills exceeded $3,000.00. However, 
plaintiff's claim, filed on November 23, 1988, was barred by the 
one-year statute of limitations. In any event, only one year and 
24 days had lapsed between the time of the injury and meeting the 
threshold requirements under the statute. Had plaintiff filed his 
claim in a timely manner, he unquestionably would have met this 
threshold by the time of trial. 
In Jepson, this court relied on Cappadona v. Eckelmann, 388 
A.2d 239 (N.J. 1978). In Cappadona, the plaintiff suffered 
injuries from an automobile accident on February 1, 1975. On March 
19, 1975, the plaintiff met the statutory threshold requirement of 
$200.00 in medical expenses. Again, the plaintiffs claim was not 
timely filed and subsequently barred by the two-year statute of 
limitations. However, it was only one month and 18 days before the 
plaintiff was able to meet this nominal statutory requirement. 
Similarly, in Carter v. Cross, 373 So.2d 81 (Fla. App. 1979), 
cited on page 47 of this Courts opinion in Jepson, the plaintiff 
sustained personal injuries from an automobile accident on March 8, 
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1974. On June 3, 1974, plaintiff met the statutory threshold 
requirement by ascertaining that her injury was permanent. The 
Florida Court of Appeals found that the action was also barred by 
the running of the statute of limitations. In Carter, only two 
months and 26 days had passed before the plaintiff had met the 
statutory threshold. 
In Cappadona and Carter, the statutory threshold was met long 
before the running of the statute of limitations. In Jepson, the 
threshold was met within days after the running of the short one 
year statute of limitations. There is no question in any of these 
cases that if the plaintiffs7 claims had been timely filed, that 
they would have met their statutory threshold well before trial. 
However, in the instant action, it is highly unlikely that 
plaintiff could meet the statutory threshold before trial. 
Plaintiff's injury occurred on October 8, 1987. By the time of the 
filing of this case, September 19, 1991, nearly four years later, 
the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-3 09 had not 
yet been met. Moreover, by the time this case was dismissed by the 
trial court on February 16, 1993, there was still no credible 
evidence that plaintiff had met the statutory requirements. In 
fact, in the five and a half years since the plaintiff's initial 
injury, she can only account for $190.00 in medical expenses and is 
unable to present any conclusive evidence as to a permanent partial 
disability. 
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Additionally, if this case were permitted to go to trial, at 
least six years would have lapsed from the time the cause of action 
arose. It remains doubtful that in the forthcoming months 
plaintiff will be able to meet the necessary requirements to 
maintain her action. In fact, it seems more probable that the 
plaintiff will attempt to delay trial until she either accumulates 
the $3,000.00 minimum medical expenses or finds a medical provider 
to testify as to a permanent partial disability. 
Given the factual scenario in the instant action, it would be 
highly prejudicial to allow plaintiff to reach the no-fault thres-
hold anytime after the filing of the complaint, so long as it 
occurs before trial. In essence a plaintiff would have any number 
of years to meet threshold, so long as a complaint was filed prior 
to the statute of limitations. The strong policy reasons 
enunciated by this Court in Jepson are clearly contrary to such a 
result. 
As this Court recognized in Jepson there is a compelling 
institutional need in this day and age of congested court calendars 
to set an ascertainable end to the resolution of tort actions. If 
this Court were to allow plaintiff over five years to meet the 
statutory threshold requirements it would introduce considerable 
uncertainty into the law as well as unduly prolong resolution of 
this and similar actions. Also, insurance carriers would need to 
set aside vast open-ended reserves until such time as persons 
either accumulate medical expenses in the amount of $3,000.00 or 
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find an expert who will testify that their injuries constitute a 
"permanent disability," Such an interpretation would fly in the 
face of the underlying purpose and intent of the No-Fault Statute. 
As such, given the factual scenario in the instant action, Jepson 
does not require this Court to reverse the lower courts dismissal 
of plaintiff's complaint. 
Plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed because she 
failed to present any credible evidence that she sustained a 
"permanent disability" or injury nearly five years after the 
accident and due to her failure to reach $3,000.00 in medical 
expenses. Plaintiff admitted in discovery responses that the only 
medical expense she had incurred was a bill in the amount of 
$190.00 from St. Mark's Hospital. The trial court did not have any 
other evidence that plaintiff had met the $3,000.00 threshold. 
The trial court also did not have any credible evidence that 
plaintiff sustained a "permanent disability" or injury. Dr. 
McGlothlin testified in his deposition that several holes existed 
in the data base and he was unwilling and unable to specify what 
percentage, if any, of plaintiff's present complaints were 
attributable to the automobile accident or pre-existing degenera-
tive conditions. Dr. McGlothlin did not state in his deposition 
with any certainty that plaintiff incurred permanent partial 
disabilities as a direct and proximate result of the accident on 
October 8, 1987. The doctor testified that there is a "reasonable 
probability a portion of her complaints are attributable to the 
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accident," but he never testified that plaintiff suffered from a 
"permanent partial disability" as required by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-309. 
Additionally, prior to his deposition, Dr. McGlothlin issued 
two reports outlining his findings upon examination of plaintiff in 
March of 1992. Notably, neither of Dr. McGlothlin's reports state 
that plaintiff suffered a permanent partial disability as a result 
of the accident. Over five years after the subject accident, 
plaintiff failed to present any credible evidence establishing that 
she had met the statutory threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-309. As such, no issue of fact existed and the trial 
court was correct in dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 
The trial court also properly rejected Dr. McGlothlin's 
subsequent affidavit. Utah law provides that a party may not rely 
on a subsequent affidavit that contradicts deposition testimony to 
create an issue of fact on a motion for summary judgment unless 
there is some substantial likelihood that the deposition testimony 
was in error or the party-deponent is able to state in the 
affidavit an adequate explanation for the contradictory answer in 
the deposition. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983); 
Guardian State Bank v. Humpherys, 762 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Utah 1988); 
Floyd v. Western Surgical Assoc. , 773, P.2d 401, 403 (Utah App. 
1989); Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1322 
(Utah App. 1991). 
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Dr. McGlothlin's affidavit is not in accord with his deposi-
tion testimony. In his deposition, Dr. McGlothlin was unable to 
state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that plaintiff 
suffered a permanent partial disability. Dr. McGlothlin testified 
that because of several holes in the data base that he was 
unwilling and unable to specify what percentage, if any, of 
plaintiff's complaints were attributable to the automobile accident 
or pre-existing degenerative conditions. However, Dr. McGlothlin 
stated in his affidavit that "to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty" plaintiff suffered "some degree of permanent partial 
disability" and that some portion of that is the direct result of 
the automobile accident of October 8, 1987. 
Dr. McGlothlin failed to state in his affidavit an adequate 
explanation for the contradictory answer in his deposition. Dr. 
McGlothlin did not state in his subsequent affidavit that his prior 
deposition testimony was in error. For these reasons, Dr. 
McGlothlin's affidavit did not create an issue of fact and should 
not have been considered by the trial court. 
Lastly, plaintiff's affidavit submitted in conjunction with 
plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial did not 
create an issue of fact which would have precluded the lower court 
from granting defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Rule 701 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence provides: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, 
the witness' testimony in the form of opinions 
or inferences is limited to those opinions or 
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inferences which are (a) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful 
to a clear understanding of the witness' 
testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue. 
It is also clearly stated that an opinion on an ultimate issue is 
reserved for expert witness testimony. UTAH R. EVID. 704. 
In the lower court proceedings plaintiff fully recognized and 
agreed with the legal standard that a lay person cannot act as 
their own professional witness in giving ultimate medical opinions 
as to medical matters beyond the scope of the lay person. (RA, p. 
126) Testimony from a lay person is strictly limited to opinions 
based on the perception of the witness. 
While a lay witness may not give expert testimony as to his or 
her physical condition, he or she may state simple inferences drawn 
from his or her conscious subjective sensations concerning such 
condition. 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 546(22). See Ricrains v. Bechtel 
Power Corp., 722 P.2d 819, 824 (Wash. App. 1986) (injured person 
may testify as to her past and present condition) ; Bitzan v. 
Parisi, 558 P. 2d 775, 778 (Wash. 1977) (laymen may testify to their 
sensory perceptions); Rowe v. Maule Drug Co. , 413 P.2d 104, 110 
(Kan. 1966) (lay testimony to obvious facts and observations 
permissible). These cases emphasize that the type of testimony 
which may be rendered by a lay person includes such perceptions as 
pain, suffering, limitation of motion, loss of vision, joint stiff-
ness, and the like. The witness is confined to statements relating 
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to the outward appearance of his or her injuries and to the 
symptoms experienced by him or her. 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 546(22). 
A witness, however, is not permitted to testify as to duration 
of disability or pain that may have resulted from an injury 
sustained by him or her as to future pain and suffering. Id. See 
Cain v. Stevenson, 706 P.2d 128, 131 (Mont. 1985) (citing Zeoman v. 
State, 416 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (1979) (lay testimony insufficient to 
establish either the permanency of the injury or the possibility of 
future pain). Where an injury is subjective and a lay person 
cannot know if it will continue, expert medical testimony is 
necessary. Cain, 706 P. 2d at 131, (citing Coryell v. Conn, 276 
N.W.2d 723 (1979). 
In Cain, a subcontractor received an award of damages for back 
injuries received while working for an electrical contractor. 
During the trial, the subcontractor testified as to his past and 
present condition. The court held that this was sufficient to 
prove injury, but was not sufficient to prove permanency where 
disputed and where such permanency was not apparent from the injury 
itself. Cain, 706 P. 2d at 131. The Cain court quoted Clifford v. 
Opdyke, 383 A.2d 749, 752 (N.J. 1978), wherein it was stated, 
The question of the prognosis of an injury and 
probable permanent disability is one necessar-
ily within the ambit of expert medical opinion 
(except for disabilities which are apparent to 
a laymen, such as an amputated body member). 
And the burden of proving such permanency by 
competent medical testimony rests of course 
with plaintiff. 
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The court held that a back injury was not such that a lay person 
could plainly see, or infer from the injury, its cause and 
permanency. 
In the instant action, because plaintiff is not qualified to 
render an ultimate medical opinion regarding her physical 
condition, her affidavit stating these assertions was properly 
excluded. Plaintiff's conclusory statements that she has a 
"disability" as a result of the subject automobile accident is 
impermissible under the above-cited law. This conclusion by 
plaintiff is not a sensory perception as permitted by Rule 701. 
Plaintiff's statement that she has suffered a "disability" is a 
medical conclusion of which she has neither the skill nor expertise 
to make. 
Additionally, plaintiff's statement in her affidavit that she 
does not have a cardiac disease is equally inadmissible. Such a 
statement is a medical diagnosis for which a lay person is not 
competent to testify. The statements pertaining to disability and 
cardiac disease are not descriptions of an outward appearance or 
perception which may be observed by the senses. As such, these 
statements were properly excluded and did not create an issue of 
fact. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is evident that the trial court 
correctly dismissed plaintiff's complaint under either the standard 
applicable to a motion for summary judgment or to a motion to 
dismiss. The facts are undisputed that plaintiff failed to meet 
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the statutory threshold requirements more than five years after the 
accident. Given the factual scenario in the instant action, no 
grounds exist upon which to reverse the trial courts dismissal of 
plaintiff's complaint. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
RECONSIDER ITS PRIOR DISMISSAL 
Utah law is clear that M[t]he trial court has wide discretion 
to grant or deny a motion for a new trial . . . ." Anderson v. 
Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1983). See also Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 
P.2d 730 (Utah 1982); Alpine Credit Union v. Moeller, 656 P.2d 988 
(Utah 1982); Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982); Amoss 
v. Bennion, 517 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1973); Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. 
v. Flint, 249 P.2d 826 (Utah 1952). Additionally, an order 
granting or denying a motion for a new trial will not be overturned 
absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial judge. See 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); Barson 
by & Through Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 
1984); Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982); Schmidt v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981). 
Plaintiff seeks a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) and (7). 
Plaintiff, however, has failed to meet the requirements of Rule 59 
for a new trial. Plaintiff failed to address how the evidence was 
insufficient to justify dismissal of this action or that the 
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dismissal was an error in law. Rather, plaintiff merely claims 
that "she does not believe that the court would reach the 
conclusions previously taken after full consideration of the 
evidence before it." 
The only new morsel of "evidence" which was not before the 
trial court at the time of this determination was plaintiff's 
affidavit. However, as previously discussed, plaintiff's affidavit 
was properly excluded from consideration. It is clear that the 
evidence before the trial court when it made its initial ruling was 
sufficient to justify dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. There-
fore, plaintiff's request for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) was 
properly denied. 
Likewise, plaintiff's request for a new trial was properly 
denied under Rule 59(a)(7). Plaintiff failed to identify what 
"error in law" was committed by the trial court. It is clear from 
the record that plaintiff, at the time of filing this lawsuit, had 
not met the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309. 
Plaintiff had neither sustained medical expenses in excess of 
$3,000 as required by the statute, nor had she presented any 
credible or admissible evidence that she sustained a "permanent 
disability" as a result of the subject accident. 
Absent meeting the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-309, plaintiff may not maintain a cause of action for 
general damages. No error in law was made by the trial court in 
granting defendant's motion to dismiss. The ruling below was well 
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grounded by the record before it. As such, defendant urges this 
Court not to overturn that ruling. 
Additionally, plaintiff's motion for a new trial was nothing 
more than a motion to reconsider which is not allowed under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In her motion for new trial, 
plaintiff asked the trial court to "reverse its prior decision." 
She "repleads and incorporates her prior argument" set forth in her 
memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Plaintiff does not add any additional evidence in her motion which 
could have any effect upon the trial Court's prior ruling. 
Clearly, plaintiff was asking the Court to "reconsider" its prior 
decision. 
Utah courts have repeatedly held that a motion to reconsider 
is not expressly available under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 
1991); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 
42, 44 (Utah App. 1988); McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 978, 980 (Utah 
App. 1987); Tracy v. University of Utah Hospital, 619 P.2d 340, 342 
(Utah 1980); Peav v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1980); Utah 
State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, 469 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1970); 
Drurv v. Luncef ord, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah 1966). The Utah 
Supreme Court rationalized against reconsideration of prior rulings 
as follows: 
If the party ruled against were permitted to 
go beyond the rules and obtain a different 
ruling upon reconsideration, why should not 
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the other party who is now rules against be 
permitted to make a motion for re-reconsidera-
tion . . . ? Practical expediency demands 
that there be some finality to the actions of 
the court . . . . Peay, 607 P. 2d at 843 
(citation omitted) 
The "law of the case" doctrine is employed to avoid delay and 
to prevent injustice. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 
761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah App. 1988). The purpose of the law of the 
case doctrine is that in the interest of economy of time and 
efficiency of procedure, it is desirable to avoid the delays and 
the difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and rulings 
upon the same propositions in the same case. Id. (citations 
omitted) Furthermore, it has been repeatedly recognized that the 
law of the case doctrine is particularly applicable when, in the 
case of summary judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present the 
case in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence 
is introduced. Id. (citations omitted) 
In the present case, the law of the case doctrine prohibited 
the trial court from reconsidering its prior ruling on defendant's 
motion to dismiss. Although plaintiff submitted an affidavit which 
was not considered by the trial court in its initial ruling, the 
affidavit did not contain any new evidence which could in any 
respect effect the Court's prior ruling. Plaintiff also did not 
present any legal theories that were not already considered and 
failed to present any new material facts that were not before the 
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trial court at the time of the original decision to grant defen-
dant's motion to dismiss. 
The trial court had broad discretion to deny plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial. Plaintiff failed to make out a sufficient 
case for a new trial under Rule 59(a). She presented no new 
evidence which would alter the trial court's prior ruling to 
dismiss. Additionally, she did not provide any explanation as to 
how the evidence before the trial court was insufficient or how 
there was an error in law. For these reasons, the trial court 
properly denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial. There was no 
abuse of discretion which could lead this Court to overturn the 
trial court's ruling. 
POINT III 
TRIAL COURT HAD DISCRETION TO DENY ORAL ARGUMENT 
Failure of the trial court to grant plaintiff's request for 
oral argument on her Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial is 
not grounds for reversal of the trial court's ruling. There are no 
cases found under Utah law in which failure to grant oral argument 
under Rule 4-501(3)(b)&(c) amounts to reversible error. However, 
some courts have found that denial of oral argument is discretion-
ary. See New Mexico Feeding Co. v. Keck, 624 P.2d 1012 (N.M. 1981) 
(hearing on motion for new trial not required); Belmont Elect. 
Serv., Inc. v. Dohrn, 516 P.2d 130 (Colo. App. 1973) (question of 
permitting new trial is discretionary; denial of oral argument is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court). 
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Plaintiff7s reliance on Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P. 2d 1205 
(Utah App. 1991) , is inapplicable to the instant action. In 
Gillmor this Court found that the trial court committed reversible 
error when it granted Summary Judgment without affording the party 
moved against sufficient time to reply. Unlike the instant action, 
Gillmor involved Rule 4-501(1)(b) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration governing the time in which to respond to the 
motion. The Gillmor court held only that Rule 4-501(1) (b) was not 
followed. Contrary to plaintiff's allegations, this Court did not 
hold that any and all failures to comply with Rule 4-501 amounted 
to reversible error. 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration states, in 
pertinent part, 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be 
rendered without a hearing unless ordered by 
the court, or requested by the parties as 
provided in Paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a 
motion would dispose of the action or any 
issues in the action on the merits with 
prejudice, either party at the time of filing 
the principal memorandum in support of or in 
opposition to a motion may file a written 
request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless 
the court finds that (a) the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) 
that the dispositive issue or set of issues 
governing the granting or denial of the motion 
has been authoritatively decided. 
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Inasmuch as the language of the rule appears to be mandatory 
("such request shall be granted"), the court can exercise 
discretion in denying a request for a hearing when it finds that 
one of the two enumerated exceptions have been met: (1) the motion 
is frivolous or (2) the dispositive issue has been authoritatively 
decided. Although the trial court did not expressly state its 
reasoning for denying plaintiffs request for oral argument, it can 
be presumed that at least one of the two exceptions were met. Rule 
4-501 did not require the trial court to indicate in its memorandum 
decision that oral argument was denied because the court found the 
position to be frivolous or because the case had been authorita-
tively decided. For these reasons, the trial court did not commit 
a reversible error in denying plaintiff's request for oral 
argument. 
POINT IV 
TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO RECITE FACTUAL 
BASIS TO SUPPORT ITS RULINGS 
The trial court was not compelled to offer a written statement 
for the grounds for its decision because defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss and plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial 
were based on a single legal theory. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: 
The Court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56 and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground, 
(emphasis added). 
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The requirement to provide a written statement pursuant to 
Rule 52(a) arises only when the motion is based on "more than one 
ground." Under all other circumstances, no written statement of 
the court's ground for decision is required. 
The cases relied upon by appellant all contained multiple 
grounds triggering the requirement for a written statement. 
Therefore, the cases relied upon by appellant do not govern the 
resolution of the instant action. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that "the inclusion of the requirement in Rule 52(a) that 
the court shall issue a statement of the ground for its decision 
cannot bear upon the undisputed factual basis for the decision 
. . . it can only bear upon alternative theories of law that may 
apply to the facts." Neerinas v. Utah State Bar, 817 P. 2d 320, 323 
(Utah 1991). The requirement of Rule 52(a) provides an instructive 
basis for the trial court to inform the litigants of the legal 
basis for its decision. Id. 
In Neiderhauser Builders v. Campbellf 824 P. 2d 1193 (Utah App. 
1992) , plaintiff filed a claim alleging breach of contract, lien 
foreclosure, failure to bond and quantum meruit. Defendants 
counterclaimed, alleging that the lien was void, breach of 
contract, and slander. Both parties moved for summary judgment. 
Upon granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the 
court order addressed only the lien theory. On appeal it was held 
that this was insufficient and that the court should have further 
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explained its rationale in rejecting plaintiff's theories of 
quantum meruit and bonding. 
In Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins., 839 P.2d 798 
(Utah 1992), defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, 
inter alia, that the disputed insurance agreement was unambiguous 
and did not violate public policy. The motion included multiple 
legal theories. The court granted the motion, stating simply that 
it was doing so for reasons "set forth in the arguments of 
defendant." Allen, 839 P.2d at 800. The Utah Supreme Court held 
that although this statement did not comply with Rule 52(a), the 
failure to comply alone was not reversible error absent "unusual 
circumstances". Id. at 800-01. 
In Retherford v. AT&T Communications of the Mt. States, Inc., 
844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992), defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
on the grounds that the workers covered by employment contracts 
that prohibit discharge other than for just cause should not be 
able to maintain a tort action for discharge in violation of public 
policy; that the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act preempted plaintiff's 
common law causes of action; that federal labor law preempted 
plaintiff's common law causes of action; and that plaintiff failed 
to state tort claims against her former co-workers or to bring 
those claims within the period fixed by the relevant statue of 
limitations. The trial court provided a blanket statement granting 
defendant's motion. The Court held that because multiple grounds 
were presented, this statement did not comply with Rule 52(a). 
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Furthermore, failure to state the grounds for its decision 
under Rule 52(a) does not constitute reversible error absent 
unusual circumstances. See Retherford, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992); 
Allen, 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992); Neerings, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 
1991). None of these cases involved unusual circumstances and the 
courts have not discussed in the abstract what may constitute such 
circumstances. 
As demonstrated from these cases, the requirement for 
providing a written statement pursuant to Rule 52(a) arises only 
when multiple legal theories are presented for review. In the 
present case, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground 
that plaintiff's complaint failed to meet the requirements as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309. The trial court granted 
defendant's motion in its minute entry of December 2, 1992. In 
that minute entry, the court expressly stated that "[t]he matter 
fails to reach the threshold level required in 31A-22-309 UCA." 
(RA, pp. 106-07) 
Defendant's motion was based on only one ground, failure to 
meet the statutory requirement. As such, the trial court had no 
duty to provide a written statement as to its decision. 
Alternatively, even if it were determined that defendant's motion 
constituted more than one ground for dismissal, which defendant 
denies, the trial court's statement is sufficient to meet the 
requirements of Rule 52(a). The ground specifically articulated by 
the trial court in granting the motion to dismiss was plaintiff's 
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failure to reach the threshold level required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-309. 
In addition to defendant's Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff argues 
that the trial court erred in not stating its reason for denying 
plaintiff's Motion for Amendment or New Trial. Plaintiff's motion 
was brought pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
59(a)(6) & (7) and Rule 52(b). 
The differing grounds which plaintiff argues in her motion are 
not differing legal theories, but rather, differing factual 
theories for the court to consider. Plaintiff's memorandum 
supporting her motion states only that the motion was brought under 
Rule 59(a)(6) & (7) "because she does not believe that the Court 
would reach the conclusions previously taken after full considera-
tion of the evidence before it." (Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Motion for Amendment by Rescission or 
Order of Dismissal or For New Trial, RA, p. 126). 
Plaintiff argues that the affidavits and deposition testimony 
of plaintiff and Dr. McGlothlin should have been enough to elicit 
a factual argument, thus, precluding the order of dismissal. These 
are not the kind of multiple grounds intended to be covered under 
Rule 52(a). See Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W. 
Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1988) (argument that 
affidavits and depositions "clearly establish the injustice that 
will be accomplished if said summary judgment is allowed to stand" 
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did not constitute a "showing" of any of the circumstances 
specified by Rule 59(a)), 
Although plaintiff's motion purports to be on the grounds 
stated in Rule 59(a)(6), insufficiency of the evidence, or (7), 
error in law, she failed to advance any legal argument to support 
these theories in her memorandum. In fact, the memorandum only 
included arguments which she attempted to support her contention 
that she did, in fact, meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-309. Merely, stating multiple grounds in her motion, 
without any support or explanation whatsoever, was insufficient to 
trigger Rule 52(a). 
Alternatively, if it is determined that plaintiff's motion 
constituted multiple grounds, which defendant denies, the trial 
court's denial of that motion remains satisfactory. In the minute 
entry of February 1, 1993, the court stated that "[b]ased upon the 
record, the court herein denies the request for oral argument and 
denies the motion for 'amendment' or 'new trial.'" (RA, p. 181-82) 
It can be reasonably concluded that this statement refers to the 
fact that there was insufficient evidence and no error in law. 
The trial court complied with the requirements set forth in 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For these reasons, the trial 
court did not err in failing to provide a more definite statement 
of its reason for granting and denying the respective motions. 
Additionally, there are no "unusual circumstances" presented which 
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would warrant a reversal of the trial court's rulings. As such, the 
ruling of the trial court should not be disturbed. 
Notwithstanding the above, plaintiff cannot now appeal any 
error which may have been made by the trial court. Rule 52(b) 
provides, in pertinent part, 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not 
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court may amend its findings or make 
additional findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly, (emphasis added) 
Failure to object or move the trial court to correct this oversight 
under Rule 52(b), and give the trial court an opportunity to cure 
the problem, precludes consideration of the error on appeal. 
Alford v. Utah League of Cities & Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah 
App. 1990); Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah 1987); 
Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984). 
In Alford, 791 P.2d 201 (Utah App. 1990), the plaintiff sued 
for defamation. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment 
arguing that the plaintiff consented to the statements, qualified 
privilege, plaintiff's failure to give proper notice under Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act, and absolute privilege. Alford, 791 
P.2d at 2 04. This case clearly involved multiple legal theories as 
the basis for the motion. 
This Court agreed that the trial court erred in not providing 
a written statement delineating which alternative theory it 
accepted in granting the summary judgment motion. Id. However, 
since plaintiff failed to timely object or move the trial court to 
33 
correct this oversight, which defendant denied any, under Rule 
52(b), it was not considered on appeal. 
In the present case, plaintiff failed on two different 
occasions to make a timely objection to the court7s written state-
ments on the respective motions. The minute entry prepared in 
response to defendant's Motion to Dismiss was made on December 2, 
1992. Plaintiff did not make a Rule 52(b) motion until December 
16, 1992, in her Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial, which 
was clearly longer than the time permitted under the rule. As 
such, it should not have been considered at that time and certainly 
should not be considered now on appeal. 
Moreover, the lower court's minute entry in response to 
plaintiffs Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial was made on 
February 2, 1993. Plaintiff does not again raise any objection to 
the form of this order until her brief appealing the final order of 
dismissal and order denying amendment of order or new trial. This 
brief was not filed until May 14, 1993, over three months after the 
decision of the trial court. Even assuming, arguendo, that the 
objection is incorporated into plaintiff's Notice of Appeal, that 
objection was not made until March 11, 1993. Under either alter-
native, the time period for objecting to the form of the order had 
long passed. 
In summary, the trial court did not err in not providing a 
fuller explanation of its reasons for granting and denying the 
respective motions. Only one legal theory was at issue in both 
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situations. Alternatively, even if it is determined that more that 
one legal theory was present, the trial court's reasoning was 
sufficient under Rule 52(a), The rule does not state the 
extensiveness of the explanation, only that one be made. This was 
fulfilled in both minute entries. 
Lastly, plaintiff did not timely object to the form of either 
minute entry made by the trial court. Any objections were made 
well after the 10 day limitation period under Rule 52(b). Even if 
this Court makes a determination that the trial court's minute 
entries were insufficient, plaintiff cannot now make such an 
objection. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant-Appellee respectfully requests this Court to affirm 
the lower court's Order of Dismissal and Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial and Request for Oral 
Argument. _ 
1/ % 
Dated this \\Q day of June, 1993. 
STRONG A HANNI 
'ctorilT*K.~' Kidman 
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